diff --git a/bsspeke.c b/bsspeke.c
index bbb393dba36c0118cb17b21fc11029c9e8078bc4..3d19f4c33e014c233bd0ff0cbea747582c95ce45 100644
--- a/bsspeke.c
+++ b/bsspeke.c
@@ -309,72 +309,6 @@ bsspeke_client_verify_message4(const bsspeke_msg4_t *msg4,
 
 int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 {
-    // Before execution of the protocol
-    // Both have:
-    //       idS = server identity
-    char *server_id;
-    // Client has:
-    //       idC = client identity
-    char *client_id;
-    char *password;
-    // Server has these for "idC":
-    //       salt
-    //       settings
-    //       P = hashToPoint(p)
-    //       V = v * P
-    uint8_t salt[32];
-    uint8_t P[32];   // curve point
-    uint8_t V[32];   // curve point
-
-
-    // Step 1: Client hashes password, maps to a point on the curve, blinds with a random value
-    // C:    r = random()
-    // C:    R = r * hashToPoint(H(password, idC, idS))
-    // C->S: idC, R
-    uint8_t r[32];   // scalar
-    uint8_t R[32];   // curve point
-
-
-    // Step 2: Server generates response with blind salt
-    // S: b = random()
-    // S: B = b * P
-    // S: R' = H(salt) * R
-    // C<-S: B, R', settings
-    uint8_t b[32];   // scalar
-    uint8_t B[32];   // curve point
-    uint8_t R_prime[32];  // curve point
-
-    // Step 3: 
-    // C:    BlindSalt = (1/r) * R'
-    // C:    p || v = pwKdf(password, BlindSalt, idC, idS, settings)
-    // C:    P = hashToPoint(p)
-    // C:    a = random()
-    // C:    A = a * P
-    // C:    K_c = H(idC, idS, A, B, a * B, v * B)
-    // C:    verifierC = H(K_c, verifyCModifier)
-    // C->S: A, verifierC[, encryptedDataC]
-    uint8_t blind_salt[32];  // curve point
-    uint8_t password_hash[64]; // hash
-    uint8_t client_P[32];    // curve point
-    uint8_t a[32];           // scalar
-    uint8_t A[32];           // curve point
-    uint8_t K_c[32];         // hash
-    uint8_t verifierC[32];   // hash
-
-
-    // Step 4:
-    //    S: K_s = H(idC, idS, A, B, b * A, b * V)
-    //    S: Checks verifierC == H(K_s, verifyCModifier)
-    //    S: verifierS = H(K_s, verifySModifier)
-    // C<-S: verifierS[, encryptedDataS]
-    uint8_t K_s[32];         // hash
-    uint8_t server_hash[32]; // hash -- should match verifierC
-
-    
-    // Step 5:
-    // C:    Checks verifierS == H(K_c, verifySModifier)
-    uint8_t client_hash[32]; // hash -- should match verifierS
-
 
     return 0;
 }